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“I have never had any [enemies] other than those of the state.” 
–Cardinal de Richelieu, First Minister of France 1624-1642  
Introduction 
In October 1990, when a guerrilla force composed mainly of exiled Rwandan Tutsis calling itself 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from bases in southern Uganda with the 
intent of overthrowing the existing, Hutu-dominated regime in Kigali (the Rwandan capital), few 
observers could have predicted the transformative effects the ensuing RPF victory would have on 
the security milieu of Africa’s Great Lakes region.  
After defeating a regime responsible for a genocide that saw at least 800,000 Tutsi and moderate 
Hutu killed in a three-month period and successfully seizing control of Rwanda in July 1994, the 
newly-installed Tutsi regime felt compelled to turn outward to ensure its own security and 
guarantee sustainable domestic peace. In the four years after the end of its own civil war, 
Rwanda would militarily intervene twice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)[1]—first 
in 1996 and again in 1998—in operations that initially appeared to serve limited objectives, but 
that soon became full-scale invasions of its much larger western neighbor. 
Rwanda’s 1998 invasion of the DRC proved an especially destructive enterprise. The intervention 
provoked a continental-scale war that drew in no less than seven foreign armies and countless 
rebel groups and militias. The fighting exacted a particularly devastating humanitarian toll with 3.3 
million deaths between 1998-2002, primarily from war-related starvation and disease.[2] And 
although the Pretoria Agreement signed by Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Congolese 
President Joseph Kabila in July 2002 effectively ended major hostilities and led to the withdrawal 
of all foreign forces from the DRC, tensions between the two countries remain high. While peace 
in a nominal sense does exist, a resumption of hostilities remains a real possibility. Only a 
comprehensive understanding of Rwanda’s long-term security interests and foreign policy goals 
vis-à-vis the DRC can offer insight into prospects for a definitive peace. 
This article seeks to examine the underlying causes of Rwanda’s successive interventions in the 
DRC, with particular attention given to the country’s decision to invade in 1998. It will argue that 
while the security threat posed by the former Hutu-dominated Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) 
and Interahamwe militia based in the DRC factored prominently in Rwanda’s decision to 
intervene in both 1996 and 1998, the 1998 campaign was unique in that Rwanda’s emergence as 
a regional power combined with a heightened threat from Hutu insurgents to render the use of 
force a particularly attractive option. The article will also compare Rwanda’s relative success in its 
1996-1997 campaign with the shortcomings of its much longer, more recent foray, offering insight 
in to why the country was unable to achieve a similar degree of success during its second 
intervention. Finally, it will assess prospects for future conflict between Rwanda and the DRC in 
light of the ongoing Congolese postwar transition and the April 2005 declaration by the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe successor group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), 
that it was abandoning its armed struggle against the Rwandan government and would 
henceforth seek repatriation.[3]   
Hutu Exodus  
Any understanding of Rwanda’s post-1994 foreign policy in the DRC must begin with the 
aftereffects of the Rwandan civil war, specifically those resulting from the genocide. Of these 
consequences, the most critical was the influx of more than one million Hutu refugees—including 
political and military officials of the former regime who had perpetrated the genocide—into the 
neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, then Zaire) and their subsequent settlement in 
UN-established refugee camps. This massive exodus was facilitated by direct military intervention 
from the French, a long-time supporter of the defeated Hutu regime. Under “Operation 
Turquoise,” launched in the closing days of the Rwandan civil war, France established a 
humanitarian zone in southern Rwanda. Ostensibly aimed at providing a safe haven for refugees 
fleeing the genocide, in reality, the French-protected safe zone was used by tens of thousands of 
Hutu extremists who had perpetrated the genocide to flee the country.[4] The RPF, unwilling to 
risk the possibility of an increased and more aggressive French presence, chose not to directly 
engage French troops. When the RPF signed a ceasefire to end the civil war in July 1994, it was 
clear that France’s intervention had denied the group the “total victory” needed to guarantee the 
new regime’s security. 
As an uninterrupted and seemingly limitless flow of Hutu refugees poured from Rwanda into the 
DRC, the UN and other non-governmental organizations maneuvered to establish refugee camps 
in hopes of mitigating a potential humanitarian disaster. As a matter of practical consideration, the 
majority of these camps were settled in the North and South Kivu provinces of eastern DRC, both 
of which are contiguous to Rwanda. The settlement of these camps so close to Rwandan territory 
quickly presented a challenge for the new Rwandan government as the international community 
proved unwilling to separate innocent civilians in the camps from those that committed genocide. 
Repeated calls by Rwanda for the disarmament of the génocidaires  were treated as beyond the 
UN’s capabilities given the enormity of the refugee population and the primacy of the 
humanitarian mission.[5] 
The fact that virtually the entire state structure of the former Hutu-dominated regime had fled with 
the majority refugee population meant that the full organizational and administrative talents of an 
entire government remained largely intact inside the camps.[6] In this context, the ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe were able to use Congolese territory to reorganize, re-equip, train and recruit new 
fighters.[7] The retention of bureaucratic know-how from the former Rwandan government, 
coupled with a steady flow of resources from humanitarian aid agencies, allowed the 
génocidaires to preserve, if not strengthen, their military posture. By early 1995, the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe presence in eastern DRC totaled 50,000 fighters with combat units arranged 
into a highly organized, disciplined military structure that cut across refugee camps.[8] 
Pretext for War  
The considerable size of the reconstituted Hutu force, while cause for concern in and of itself, 
was only one factor in Rwanda’s overall strategic calculus leading to the decision to intervene in 
the DRC. For (then) Rwandan Vice President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame, it was not just 
the size, but rather the proven ability of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe to launch attacks into Rwanda 
that was so alarming. As early as October 1994, Hutu militants based in eastern DRC were 
conducting raids into Rwanda’s border provinces. By November 1995 their capacity to strike had 
enhanced to the point where they were launching medium-scale operations in Rwanda’s southern 
provincial capital of Butare as well as on the outskirts of the capital, Kigali.[9] While Kagame 
repeatedly urged Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko to rein in the génocidaires, little was 
done to assuage Rwandan fears of an impending Hutu invasion. Mobutu, a strong ally of the 
former Rwandan regime, appeared to accept the presence of the ex-FAR in eastern DRC as an 
effective means of containing his own domestic opposition which had traditionally been most 
vociferous in the east.[10]  
The influx of Rwandan Hutu into the North and South Kivu provinces of eastern DRC upset the 
region’s ethno-communal balance and ultimately provided a “humanitarian” pretext for Rwanda’s 
subsequent intervention. Seeking to exploit the newfound strength in numbers that accompanied 
the arrival of the génocidaires, Congolese Hutu in the region openly aligned with the exiled 
militants and helped mobilize attacks against local Congolese Tutsi. The situation deteriorated in 
September 1996 when the ex-FAR/Interahamwe (with encouragement from Mobutu and 
sanctioning from local Hutu government officials) instigated an ethnic cleansing campaign that led 
to the displacement of the entire Congolese Tutsi population of North Kivu, estimated to have 
been tens of thousands of Tutsi.[11] The majority of these Tutsi refugees fled to Rwanda. In early 
October, the génocidaires, who were now more or less formally allied with Mobutu’s Zairian 
Armed Forces (FAZ), sought to replicate this ethnic cleansing campaign in South Kivu. Before 
they could do so, however, Congolese Tutsi native to the province (called Banyamulenge) 
launched a “preemptive” attack against ex-FAR/ Interahamwe and FAZ positions.[12] Rwanda 
immediately intervened on the side of the Banyamulenge rebels, a decision soon revealed as the 
opening gambit of the first Congolese war. 
Within a month of the initial uprising, Congolese rebels and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) 
troops that fought alongside them had captured the cities of Uvira, Goma, and Bukavu (the last 
two being the capitals of North and South Kivu respectively).[13] Rwandan Defense Minister Paul 
Kagame, encouraged by the offensive momentum established early on, also knew that carrying 
the rebellion further would require the involvement of a broader cross-section of Congolese 
opposition groups beyond the Tutsi. The result was the formation of the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo/DRC (ADFL), a loose coalition of various anti-Mobutu groups 
of which Laurent Kabila—a Luba from Katanga province—would emerge the leader. In December 
1996, as Mobutu’s troops prepared to launch a counteroffensive to “liberate” eastern DRC, it 
would be Kabila’s ADFL that provided the legitimacy necessary to galvanize the Congolese 
masses on the side of rebels, and by extension, their Rwandan backers. Kabila, who was no 
stranger to rebellion in the Congo, exploited the coincidence of interest with Rwanda to the fullest 
extent.[14] Kagame, for his part, was fully aware that Mobutu would never countenance a long-
term Rwandan presence on Congolese soil, and thus welcomed the prospect of regime change 
and embraced Kabila’s ADFL as an indispensable ally. A campaign that appeared to begin as a 
mere proxy border war by Rwanda thus turned into a full-fledged civi l war to oust Mobutu.[15] 
Notably, even as the overall number of Rwandan troops participating in the fighting declined as 
the conflict spread from east to west, Rwanda’s role in orchestrating the rebellion and dictating 
overall military strategy increased as the rebels closed in on the capital, Kinshasa. 
The fall of Kinshasa on May 17, 1997 to Kabila’s ADFL and the RPA troops that backed them 
was above all else a victory for Rwanda. Not only did Rwanda succeed in dismantling a large 
number of Hutu refugee camps and igniting a massive repatriation of more than half a million 
refugees back to Rwanda, it also secured a powerful role in the internal affairs of its neighbor. 
After the war, Rwandan officers were awarded prominent posts in Kabila’s new Congolese Armed 
Forces (FAC), including the appointment of Rwandan general James Kabare to head Kabila’s 
army as chief of staff. Responsibility for the organization, training, and even the deployment of 
many FAC units was given to Rwandan commanders allowing the country free rein in eastern 
Congo to root out remaining Hutu militants.[16] In the months after Kabila’s assumption of power, 
Rwanda also deployed thousands of its own troops to eastern DRC creating a substantial buffer 
zone in North and South Kivu from which to repel potential ex-FAR/ Interahamwe attacks.[17] 
Rwanda’s role as Kabila’s benefactor thus had practical strategic benefits that the country would 
not forfeit lightly under any terms. As Rwanda increasingly came to view its dominant role in 
Congolese affairs as essential to securing its national security interests, any developments that 
appeared to undermine this position were bound to provoke a response. 
Declining Rwandese-Congolese Relations In the Kabila Era 
The Rwanda-DRC alliance lasted just fourteen months before Rwanda, in a dramatic volte face, 
launched a second campaign in the Congo—this time to topple former ally Laurent Kabila. Again 
the intervention began as a military operation to support an “indigenous” rebellion, this time 
instigated by mutinous Banyamulenge units of the elite 10th and 12th army brigades of the FAC, 
headquartered in North and South Kivu respectively.[18] The Banyamulenge troops were 
protesting the increased marginalization of Congolese Tutsi in the FAC command structure as 
well as Kabila’s decision to integrate former soldiers of Mobutu’s FAZ within Banyamulenge 
units.[19] On August 2, 1998, these developments combined with an overall growing 
dissatisfaction with Kabila’s rule to trigger the desertion of “nearly all 10,000 Banyamulenge 
troops” from the FAC.[20] Rwanda, seeking to exploit such an open and massive split in Kabila’s 
army, intervened shortly thereafter. 
Given the ties forged between Rwanda and Kabila during the previous Congo war, what factors 
contributed to the abrupt deterioration in the Rwanda-DRC relationship and prompted Rwanda’s 
second intervention? First, it must be emphasized that the alliance between Rwanda and Kabila 
had been a relationship of convenience rather than a genuine partnership based on agreed 
ideological principles. Cooperation between Rwanda and the ADFL had been based exclusively 
on a common interest in overthrowing Mobutu, not a shared vision of regional security.[21] 
Beyond this agreed anti-Mobutu agenda (the motives of which had been different for Rwanda and 
the ADFL rebels), there was little philosophical basis from which to build and sustain a long-term 
strategic relationship.  
Second, the inherent tenuousness of the partnership was exacerbated by Kabila’s decision to 
distance himself from his Rwandan sponsors. While Rwandan support had been critical to 
Kabila’s victory during the first Congolese war, it had since become a liability for the new 
Congolese ruler seeking to “legitimize himself” as a true nationalist.[22] Continued foreign support, 
particularly the presence of Rwandan officers in the FAC, reinforced a perception among the 
Congolese public that Kabila was overly dependent on external backing and undermined his 
credibility as a ruler. Sensing that his reliance on Rwanda had reached a point of diminishing 
returns, in July 1998 Kabila ordered all foreign troops out of the DRC, a decision that included the 
dismissal of Rwandan general James Kabare as head of the FAC.[23] Such a move directly 
threatened not only Rwanda’s continued ability to eliminate the génocidaires  remaining in the 
Congo, but also its emergence as a regional power. Keen on protecting the extensive regional 
political-military influence it had amassed during the first Congolese war and its aftermath, 
Rwanda viewed a second military intervention as necessary to secure its advantageous strategic 
position in the region. The relative ease with which Rwanda had effected Mobutu’s overthrow less 
than two years before strengthened the country’s belief that Kabila could be defeated in similar 
fashion. 
Finally, an escalating threat from Hutu militants also contributed to the collapse of the Rwanda-
DRC relationship. The massive repatriation of Hutu refugees back to Rwanda during the 1996 
war had included an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 ex-FAR/ Interahamwe who immediately began to 
organize and launch attacks upon their return, creating an insurgency in the northwest that also 
drew support from ex-FAR/Interhamwe forces still based in the DRC.[24] The insurgents aimed to 
wipe out the small Tutsi population of the area, seize control of all local government offices, and 
mobilize ordinary Hutu to take up arms against the RPF regime.[25] While it is unlikely Kabila 
directly supported the northwest insurgency, Rwanda drew a direct connection between his 
indifference to the Hutu militants who remained in the DRC and the strength of the Hutu 
insurgents based in Rwanda. Like Mobutu before him, Kabila made no attempt to demobilize ex-
FAR/Interahamwe forces that had survived Rwanda’s 1996 campaign in the Congo and resisted 
repatriation. Analysts estimate that at least 5,000 remained in bases around North Kivu even 
while Rwanda established a military presence throughout the Congo in the early days of Kabila’s 
rule.[26] Now, with the preponderance of the Hutu force based inside Rwanda, the thousands of 
Hutu militants that remained in the eastern DRC served as a critical rear base of support for the 
northwest insurgency.  
The security threat for Rwanda was, at a minimum, just as immediate as it had been preceding 
the country’s first intervention in the Congo. The potency of the northwest insurgency–which 
Timothy Longman contends was tantamount to a “virtual civil war”[27]—heightened Rwanda’s 
sense of vulnerability and reinforced the siege mentality that had underpinned the regime’s view 
of national security since it came to power after ending the 1994 genocide. Given Kabila’s 
apparent complicity—or at least insufficient concern for Rwanda’s interests—a second invasion of 
the Congo came to be viewed as the only means of confronting an escalating threat from Hutu 
militants who had progressed from launching cross-border raids to being capable of fomenting 
large-scale civil unrest. For Rwanda, national security could only be guaranteed by taking the 
fight to the génocidaires, just as it had in 1996. 
Rwanda’s Second Campaign 
Within days of the August 1998 uprising by Banyamulenge units of Kabila’s FAC, Rwanda had 
not only intervened, but had opened up two fronts against Kabila’s army. In the east, 
Banyamulenge rebels and RPA troops focused on securing North and South Kivu and then 
advancing towards Kisangani in the north and Katanga in the south. An RPA contingent in the 
West opened up a second front by mobilizing tens of thousands of former FAZ soldiers being held 
by Kabila for eventual integration into the FAC,[28] placing anti-Kabila forces some 150 miles 
outside of Kinshasa by the end of August. On both fronts, the offensive was initially reminiscent of 
the 1996 campaign in its quickness and precision. As the war continued, the difference that 
emerged was not in the intensity of the fighting, but rather the scale of the military commitment. At 
the height of the war in 1999, Rwanda not only had the support of Burundi and Uganda, it also 
had an estimated 24,000 troops deployed to the DRC, a number that dwarfed its previous 
commitment.[29]  
It soon became clear, however, that Rwanda’s second invasion of the Congo would prove much 
more difficult than the first. After the Rwandan-led advance toward Kinshasa was repelled by 
Angolan troops coming to Kabila’s defense, the conflict gradually reached an impasse. This 
inability to secure a military victory was due to a myriad of factors. First, when the rebellion began 
the military strategy was tied to no other political objective than the overthrow of Kabila. The 
10,000 Banyamulenge troops of the FAC that mutinied in August fought against other units in the 
area that remained loyal to Kabila, but pronounced no broader sociopolitical goal than pushing 
loyalist troops out of the Kivus and retaining Congolese Tutsi influence in the region. The political 
face of the rebellion did not emerge until three weeks after the initial uprising when, at the behest 
of Rwanda, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) was founded by an eclectic mix of 
Congolese politicians opposed to Kabila.[30] Only when the initial assault on Kinshasa failed did 
Rwanda recognize the necessity of establishing a political front.  
Second, the RCD did not enjoy nearly the same degree of domestic support as had Kabila’s 
ADFL in the campaign to oust Mobutu. Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in Congolese affairs 
during the previous year and a half and the instantaneous deployment of Rwandan troops to the 
DRC after the rebellion began created the perception among ordinary Congolese that the RCD 
was little more than a foreign creation dominated by outside (and internal) Tutsi influence. From 
its inception, the group was roundly condemned as an “instrument of neighboring countries 
created to serve their interests.”[31] This widespread suspicion of the RCD was reinforced by 
Kabila’s success in stoking anti-Tutsi sentiment both before the war and during its early stages, 
making it particularly difficult for the group to generate indigenous support to carry the rebellion 
forward.  
A third reason Rwanda failed to achieve definitive success during the second Congolese war was 
Uganda’s decision to withdraw its support and wage its own war effort separate from Rwanda. 
The breakdown in the relationship was surprising in the sense that the two ruling regimes (not the 
countries per se) share a rather complex regional history. The RPF rebels that came to power in 
Rwanda in 1994 had spent much of their adult lives in Uganda as refugees. Many of them had 
fought with Yoweri Museveni’s National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) during the Ugandan civil 
war and were awarded prominent positions in the Ugandan army after Museveni came to power 
in 1986.[32] During the 1990-1994 Rwandan civil war, the RPF received critical support from 
Uganda, especially during the first year of the conflict when the group suffered early defeats at 
the hands of the Rwandan Hutu army.  
After the RPF vi ctory in Rwanda, relations between the new Tutsi-led regime and Uganda 
remained positive. In 1996, Uganda lent both moral and military support to the Rwanda-ADFL 
campaign to overthrow Mobutu whose failure to address the continued presence of Ugandan 
rebels in northeastern DRC was having an increasingly deleterious impact on that country’s own 
security.[33] When Rwanda re-entered the DRC in August 1998, Uganda’s decision to commit 
troops in support of the anti-Kabila rebellion was entirely consistent with the history of cooperation 
between the two countries.  
But it quickly became clear that the two allies had fundamentally different conceptions of how the 
second rebellion should proceed. During the first six months of fighting, Uganda repeatedly 
voiced its displeasure toward Rwanda’s “unilateral” creation of the RCD.[34] Rwanda’s dominant 
influence and Uganda’s belief that it had to assert more control over the direction of the rebellion 
to increase its political-military clout in any post-Kabila order prompted the latter to encourage 
splits in the rebel movement. In early 1999 the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) broke away 
from the larger, Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma “core” rebel group and aligned with Uganda. At 
roughly the same time as the RCD-ML split, Uganda also sponsored the creation of a northern-
based rebel group called the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), which soon after its 
formation emerged as the most cohesive of the anti-Kabila rebel movements. These divisions 
allowed Uganda to open its own front in the war against Kabila, focusing military operations in the 
north and northwest where its rebel proxies were based. Open conflict between Rwandan and 
Ugandan troops in the northeastern city of Kisangani in August 1999 and early 2000 further 
revealed the extent to which relations between the prior allies had deteriorated.[35] As a result of 
this fallout, Rwanda was forced to fight much of the second Congolese war without the support of 
its central regional ally. 
The final factor cont ributing to Rwanda’s failure to duplicate the success of its 1996 campaign 
against Mobutu was the decisive role played by Kabila’s regional allies during the war. At least 
four countries— Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad—committed troops to defend Kabila and 
help stem the rebel advance, particularly against Rwanda-RCD-Goma operations in central and 
southeastern DRC. The military commitment of Kabila’s allies dramatically altered the balance of 
forces in the DRC, a shift made more important since Rwanda and Uganda were no longer 
fighting a united front, and even were clashing with each other. Angola deployed 3,000 to 5,000 
troops during the course of the conflict, Namibia 2,000, and Zimbabwe an estimated 11,000 to 
13,000.[36] These foreign forces augmented Kabila’s FAC with artillery and tank support, air 
power (Angola), and generally better-trained soldiers. Moreover, Kabila’s foreign allies achieved 
decisive tactical victories early in the war that helped thwart Rwanda’s attempts to secure a quick, 
blitzkrieg-like victory. For example, in late August 1998 Angola attacked and defeated Rwanda-
RCD positions in the DRC’s Lower Congo province as they were preparing to march on Kinshasa. 
This intervention is widely believed to have “saved” Kabila from what otherwise appeared to be 
certain defeat by Rwandan-led forces. When the focus of the rebellion shifted back east after the 
first few months of fighting, Zimbabwean and Namibian troops (together with Angolan air power) 
proved vital to the defense of Mbuji-Mayi—a strategic diamond-producing town considered the 
“gateway to both the west and south of Congo”[37]—and Mbandaka, another strategically 
important city located along one of the Congo River’s main tributaries in northwest Equateur 
province and home to one of DRC’s regional airports.  
Since Uganda had suspended its support as early as August 1999 and Burundi’s modest military 
contribution never exceeded 1,000 troops, Rwanda was forced to engage an adversary that 
enjoyed extensive and steadfast regional backing, essentially alone. For Rwanda, this reality was 
a stark contrast to the “utterly isolated” Mobutist state it had defeated only two years before.[38] 
During the second Congolese war, it would be Rwanda that found itself isolated. While Rwanda 
and its foreign and rebel allies were able to conquer and consolidate control over one-third of the 
DRC within two years of war, the intervention of Kabila’s regional backers stemmed any further 
advance and helped produce the military stalemate that would eventually force Kabila’s 
adversaries to the negotiating table. 
A Diminished Threat?  
Rwanda’s willingness to sign the Pretoria Agreement on July 31, 2002 and withdraw nearly all of 
its troops from the DRC three months later was not based solely on general wartime exhaustion. 
During the course of the war, Rwanda scored a number of victories against the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe that helped reduce the threat emanating from Hutu bases in the DRC. In 2001 
alone, Rwandan troops killed or captured more than 4,000 ex -FAR/Interahamwe fighters (now 
called the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR), critically weakening the 
group’s capacity to conduct military operations.[39] By assuming the offensive and engaging the 
génocidaires on Congolese soil, Rwanda limited their ability to wage war directly on Rwandan 
territory. Since it was this fear that had been the country’s preeminent security concern since 
1994 (a fear that was reinforced by the 1997-1998 northwest insurgency), Rwanda’s military 
occupation of both North and South Kivu as well as other strategic areas in central and 
southeastern DRC during the war were important successes, even in the absence of regime 
change in the Congo. 
Yet despite the weakened state of the newly named FDLR in the aftermath of the second 
Congolese war and an acknowledgement by Rwanda that the group “no longer constitutes an 
immediate threat to [the Rwandan] government,” Rwanda maintains that the 8,000 to 10,000 Hutu 
rebels in the DRC pose a security “problem” that will only grow worse if not decisively 
addressed.[40] In its view, little has been by done in the postwar period by those responsible to 
achieve this aim. Since Rwanda withdrew its troops in late 2002, it has continually expressed its 
dissatisfaction with DRC President Joseph Kabila’s lack of commitment to disarm remaining 
FDLR fighters–a disregard which it feels constitutes a direct violation of the Pretoria Agreement, 
specifically the clause obligating the DRC government to “continue with the process of tracking 
down and disarming the Interahamwe and ex-FAR within its territory.”[41] Rwanda has been 
similarly critical of the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) disarmament 
effort, lamenting the operation’s “leniency” and the lack of will within the UN to “disarm this force 
[FDLR] that committed genocide in Rwanda.”[42] A glaring disparity between MONUC’s current 
troop strength (16,000 in May 2005) with that of past peacekeeping operations confronting less 
pressing security demands and much less territory to cover (the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone fielded more than 17,000 peacekeepers at its peak in 2002) has reinforced a feeling of 
cynicism and impatience on the part of Rwanda. The country’s leaders have also exhorted the 
UN to grant more explicit enforcement authority to MONUC peacekeepers, emphasizing that 
increased troop strength alone would mean little without a clear mandate outlining what 
“[peacekeepers] can do when they are actually on the ground.”[43]   
Bukavu: Playing with Fire 
In this context, Rwanda remains poised to re-enter the DRC. In late May 2004, when 3,000 
dissident ex-RCD-Goma troops of the newly integrated Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (FARDC) clashed with loyalist troops and temporarily seized control of Bukavu, the 
prospect of Rwandan intervention to back its former rebel ally appeared likely. The fact that the 
mutiny was being justified partly on the grounds that Congolese troops were committing 
“genocide” against the Banyamulenge made the situation particularly tense, given that Rwanda’s 
two previous interventions had been preceded by similar circumstances. Although Rwandan 
troops did not physically intervene and take part in the attack on Bukavu, a United Nations Panel 
of Experts report released in July 2004 concluded that Rwanda had supported the rebellion both 
“directly and indirectly” and that the country even “exerted a degree of command and control over 
[the renegade] forces.”[44] The report affirmed that Rwandan government officials helped 
General Laurent Nkunda—one of two dissident commanders who spearheaded the attack on 
Bukavu—recruit additional fighters from inside Rwanda prior to the attack. Rwanda also provided 
sanctuary for Colonel Jules Mutebusi (General Nkunda’s co-conspirator) and an estimated 300 
dissident soldiers when they withdrew from Bukavu in mid-June 2004 following increased 
pressure from MONUC officials. 
Unsurprisingly, Rwanda’s role in the Bukavu crisis further antagonized its relationship with the 
DRC. In late June 2004 when DRC President Joseph Kabila announced that he was deploying 
10,000 Congolese soldiers to eastern DRC to facilitate the “integration of former rivals into a 
national army,” Rwanda sternly denounced the move as an unwarranted act of aggression and 
“offensive posturing.”[45] Rwandan Foreign Minister Charles Murigande declared that his country 
would not “sit back and watch” while Congolese troops deployed en masse along the Rwandan 
border. Having relinquished its buffer zone in the Kivus after withdrawing its troops in late 2002, 
Rwanda feared that a large-scale deployment of FARDC troops to eastern DRC would 
immediately place it on the defensive in any future conflict. A reinforced Congolese troop 
presence in the area would also impede Rwanda’s ability to maintain influence over ex-RCD-
Goma elements, the utility of which was made palpably clear during the seizure of Bukavu.   
Searching for a Casus Belli? 
Despite the increasingly rancorous war of words between Rwanda and the DRC in the wake of 
Bukavu, Rwanda soon recognized that no future military intervention could be justified solely on 
the basis of countering would-be aggression from Congolese troops or pre-empting a threat of 
invasion from the DRC. Nor did it need to settle for such crude, balance-of-power justifications. 
Since its first campaign in the Congo, Rwanda had successfully invoked the threat posed by Hutu 
insurgents using Congolese territory to strike Rwanda as an acceptable pretext for war. The fact 
that many of these militants had taken part in the 1994 genocide had further legitimized Rwanda’s 
successive interventions and allowed it to assume a significant degree of moral authority in its 
dealings with the Congo, particularly since the international community had done woefully little to 
stop the genocide or mitigate its pernicious aftereffects. Rwanda’s ability to launch repeated 
interventions into the Congo since 1996 had thus been linked directly to the enhanced freedom of 
action it enjoyed as a result of widespread deference to its security concerns and the perceived 
credibility of the Hutu threat. 
Accordingly, in late 2004 Rwanda abandoned its focus on condemning Congolese “aggression” 
and instead returned to the Hutu insurgent threat as its primary rationale for possible military 
action in the DRC. On 30 November, Rwandan President Paul Kagame told the Rwandan Senate 
that the failure of “the UN and other countries” to disarm the FDLR would force Rwanda to re-
enter the Congo.[46] In December, Rwandan Foreign Minister Charles Murigande emphasized 
that the “problem of ex-FAR/Interahamwe” required a decisive solution.[47] That same month 
Richard Sezibera, Rwanda’s Special Envoy to the Great Lakes, claimed that DRC-based FDLR 
fighters had been responsible for eleven attacks on Rwandan territory in the previous three 
months. All of these public remarks were intended to convince would-be detractors that Rwanda 
had an inherent right to intervene in the Congo just as it had done in 1996 and 1998.  
For many observers this sudden blitz of explanations and statements regarding the “imperative” 
of Rwandan intervention seemed more an effort to provide ex post facto justification for an 
incursion that had already occurred than it was to build a case for future military action. In a 
particularly ambiguous segment of his November speech to the Rwandan Senate, Kagame 
suggested that operations to search out and “disarm” Hutu militants in the DRC may already have 
started, saying “it could even be happening now.”[48] But while speculation abounded as to 
whether or not Rwandan troops had actually crossed the border into the DRC—in December, 
MONUC reportedly sighted 100 Rwandan troops in North Kivu[49]—it soon became clear that no 
large-scale troop movement across the border had occurred. While Rwanda had almost certainly 
begun preparations for another intervention, by late 2004 it had not yet re-entered the DRC in full 
force.   
The heightened tensions between Rwanda and the DRC in late 2004 were defused by a number 
of subsequent events that served to slow the momentum towards open conflict. In February 2005 
the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whelan, traveled to 
Rwanda and met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame, presumably to discuss Rwanda’s 
ongoing security concerns and temper the country’s increasingly aggressive stance. From 
February to April 2005 successive meetings of the Tripartite Commission established in 2004 
between Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC resulted in an agreement to “put an end to the threat 
posed to the security of these three countries by the presence and activities of negative forces” in 
the eastern DRC.[50] The FDLR was explicitly mentioned in the agreement, suggesting a 
deliberate effort to recognize and promote Rwandan security interests as fundamental to peace in 
the region. Finally, on April 15, 2005, approximately two weeks after a watershed announcement 
by the FDLR renouncing the use of force against Rwanda and condemning the 1994 genocide, 
Rwandan President Paul Kagame traveled to the U.S. and met with President George W. Bush 
who expressed hope that Rwanda would proceed in its “efforts to move forward” with 
reconciliation and reintegration.[51] In just four months, the looming prospect of a third Rwandan 
incursion that had arisen in the wake of the Bukavu crisis had diminished to the point where a 
future Rwanda-DRC conflict seemed unlikely.   
Prospects for Peace 
The FDLR announcement on March 31, 2005 that it was abandoning its armed struggle and 
would henceforth “refrain from any offensive operation against Rwanda”[ 52] certainly has the 
potential to be a breakthrough for peace in the region. All previous Rwandan interventions in the 
Congo (and near-interventions for that matter) had been based principally on the security threat 
posed by Hutu insurgents in the DRC which had consistently planned and launched attacks into 
Rwanda from bases on Congolese territory since late 1994. If the estimated 8,000 to 10,000 
FDLR fighters remaining in the Congo were to voluntary disarm and repatriate, Rwandan security 
concerns would presumably be addressed and the underlying rationale for its foreign policy since 
1994 rendered irrelevant. Having repeatedly stressed that the primary reason for war with the 
DRC was a failure by that country to rein in Hutu militants, Rwanda would be obliged to moderate 
its behavior and assume a less aggressive stance towards its neighbor, lest it be viewed as an 
obstructionist to peace. Without an “enemy” to point to as justification for military action, Rwanda 
would have less latitude than it enjoyed in the past to pursue its foreign policy objectives in the 
DRC. 
Even though the FDLR “declaration of peace” has removed one of Rwanda’s primary rationales 
for intervening in the DRC, the prospects for an enduring peace between the two countries 
remains relatively dim. The first reason relates to Rwanda’s skepticism of FDLR intentions. After 
nearly ten years of being subjected to destabilizing cross-border incursions by an insurgent force 
whose members had perpetrated or otherwise identified themselves with the 1994 genocide, 
Rwanda’s reaction to the FDLR’s newfound desire for peace has been tepid at best. Upon 
learning of the FDLR’s decision to disarm, Rwanda’s Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Richard 
Sezibera remarked, “If they [the FDLR] said it, it’s a good thing.”[53] Other Rwandan officials 
have stressed that while the decision is welcome, they believe it has more to do with increased 
pressure from the DRC government (the “Rome negotiations” that led to the FDLR declaration 
were initiated by DRC President Joseph Kabila) and the threat of Rwandan military action than a 
genuine desire for peace on the part of the FDLR. This suspicion of FDLR motives has been 
deepened by the myriad political conditions the group seeks to demand from Rwanda, including 
status as a legitimate political party, general amnesty from prosecution for crimes committed 
during the genocide, and a formal recognition by the Rwandan government of a “second” 
genocide against the Hutu.[54]  
Since Rwanda is unlikely to negotiate directly with the FDLR and insists the group will receive no 
concessions for laying down its arms and repatriating, the actual disarmament and repatriation of 
the FDLR is likely to remain stalled. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that all FDLR 
commanders will be as amenable to peace as the movement’s leader, Ignace Murwanashyaka, 
has been thus far. On May 12, 2005, Murwanashyaka began traveling throughout eastern Congo 
to “educate” FDLR combatants about the peace declaration,[55] a process that may take a 
considerable amount of time and effort and definitely a degree of coaxing and cajoling. Rwandan 
impatience will surely grow if hardline FDLR commanders stonewall progress toward 
disarmament.  
Moreover, a partial repatriation of the more moderate members of the group could actually 
increase prospects for conflict by encouraging Rwanda to place more pressure on FDLR fighters 
choosing to remain in the DRC. In the event a portion of the FDLR does reject peace with 
Rwanda, the onus would again be on the DRC to forcibly disarm the remaining fighters. If the 
DRC government is too slow (or unwilling) to do so, Rwanda could conceivably launch a third 
military intervention in the Congo aimed at extirpating remaining FDLR fighters. Such a move 
would provoke a strong response from the DRC sending the two countries down a lamentably 
familiar road toward war. 
Beyond the FDLR “problem,” two other interrelated factors could significantly increase prospects 
of a third Congolese war. The first is Rwanda’s expanded conception of “national interest” 
developed during the 1998 war and plainly demonstrated during the June 2004 Bukavu crisis. 
While Hutu insurgents operating from the Congo have been the mainstay of Rwandan security 
strategy since 1994, the country has come to regard the DRC provinces of North and South Kivu 
as a sort of chasse gardée to be maintained regardless of a Hutu threat. After four years of 
occupying this region during the second Congolese war, Rwanda retained strong links to former 
RCD-Goma elements (both military and political officials) even after it withdrew in late 2002. 
These links have allowed it to exert a significant degree of influence over local developments and 
ultimately undermine the Congolese government’s efforts to establish authority over the region.  
Rwanda’s support for ex-RCD-Goma commanders General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Jules 
Mutebusi during the seizure of Bukavu was illustrative of the country’s broader security agenda. 
Rwanda helped organize the “revolt,” likely in response to DRC President Joseph Kabila’s 
attempts to reduce RCD-Goma’s political and military predominance in South Kivu, not as a 
means of directly countering FDLR aggression or confronting the Hutu insurgent threat. Should 
Rwanda continue to insist on maintaining a sphere of influence in the Kivus—a likely possibility 
even if the FDLR does disarm—war could result from the DRC’s attempts to disrupt what it 
perceives as undue interference in its internal affairs.  
Secondly, the fragility of the DRC’s postwar transition seems to suggest that one or two domestic 
crises could trigger the collapse of the peace process and a reversion to war. In this respect, the 
government’s ongoing effort to integrate ex-RCD-Goma units into the Congolese national army 
(the FARDC) is of particular importance. While many of RCD-Goma’s rank -and-file political 
officials have proved willing to participate in the DRC’s transitional government, the group’s 
military commanders have proved much less cooperative. Although their recalcitrance is partly a 
function of the lost of power integration into the national army would entail, it is probably more so 
a reflection of Rwanda’s continued influence over RCD-Goma hardliners, especially in the Kivus. 
General Laurent Nkunda, presumably with assurances from Rwanda, refused his appointment in 
the new national army as regional commander of the 8th military region in Goma months before 
his involvement in the May-June 2004 seizure of Bukavu.[56] Other former RCD-Goma officers 
have turned down similarly high-ranking posts and opted to retain independent control of their 
troops. If DRC President Joseph Kabila is unable to induce these former rebel commanders to 
join the FARDC, he may seek to do so by force, particularly if the December 2005 Congolese 
elections result in a stronger consensus among his party and RCD-Goma moderates. The upshot 
of such an effort would likely be a virtual replay of the August 1998 rebellion by the 
Banyamulenge—this time by dissident RCD-Goma troops—providing an opening for yet another 
Rwandan intervention.   
Conclusion 
Since 1994, Rwanda’s foreign policy in the DRC has been a response to the continued presence 
of Hutu militants on Congolese territory, many of whom perpetrated the Rwandan genocide. In 
1996, Rwanda invaded the Congo to dismantle Hutu refugee camps used by the génocidaires  as 
staging grounds for launching attacks into Rwanda. The campaign was partly successful, but the 
Hutu threat persisted. In 1998, after suppressing an insurgency in the northwest provoked by 
Hutu militants that had infiltrated Rwanda from the DRC, Rwanda entered the Congo a second 
time, this time to defeat its ally in the 1996 war, Laurent Kabila, and root out remaining Hutu 
forces. 
Rwanda’s second intervention marked an important shift in the country’s mode of thinking 
regarding its foreign policy goals in the DRC. While the 1997-1998 Hutu insurgency revealed the 
persistent lethality of the Hutu threat, Rwanda’s growing confidence as a regional power and 
dominance of Congolese affairs in the interwar period added another dimension to the country’s 
national security interest. This was starkly revealed during the course of the second Congolese 
war in which Rwanda established significant influence over North and South Kivu, including links 
with RCD-Goma commanders in the area. These ties have allowed Rwanda to play a decisive 
role in shaping local developments to advance its own objectives, as witnessed by the Bukavu 
crisis. Reluctant to encourage its former proxies to accept integration into the Congolese national 
army (which, ironically, would probably strengthen the DRC’s capacity to deal with the remaining 
Hutu insurgents on its territory) Rwanda has attempted to undermine the transition process in 
hopes of maintaining a sphere of influence in eastern Congo.  
Thus the threat of future conflict between Rwanda and the DRC remains real. Rwanda’s 
continuing sense of vulnerability, a belief in its own moral self-righteousness stemming from the 
current regime’s role in ending the 1994 genocide, and its growing regional aspirations make the 
country particularly disposed to intervening in the Congo once again. While a complete and non-
negotiable disarmament and repatriation by the FDLR or a successful effort by DRC President 
Joseph Kabila and MONUC forces to forcibly disarm remaining Hutu fighters would certainly 
reduce the likelihood of future conflict, even such optimistic scenarios would not guarantee an 
enduring peace. Ultimately, it will be the interplay between the DRC’s attempts to consolidate 
power in the midst of a postwar transition and Rwanda’s efforts to maintain influence in North and 
South Kivu that will determine prospects for war. Since these goals are in many ways 
irreconcilable, the question might not be whether a third showdown between Rwanda and the 
DRC will occur, but rather when.  
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